





Sandstrom v. Montana' refined the constitutional limitations on
presumptions2 used in criminal cases and raised to constitutional signifi-
cance the principle that a trial court cannot prejudge the issue of intent
when intent is an element of the crime charged. In Sandstrom, the Supreme
Court also clarified the due process restrictions that have developed in
regard to presumptions. This Comment will first examine the premise
behind the use of presumptions and the continuing validity of this eviden-
tiary device. The decisions that have shaped the guidelines for presump-
tions, and the relationship of these cases to Sandstrom will then be
examined. Finally, this Comment will consider Sandstrom's impact on the
present state of the law and possible future ramifications.
David Sandstrom was charged with "deliberate homicide" under a
Montana statute3 that required the defendant to possess purpose or
knowledge in the commission of the crime. Sandstrom confessed to the
killing but maintained that he lacked the requisite state of mind because of
a "mental disease" that precluded criminal responsibility. 4
At the trial level, the prosecution requested an instruction that "[t]he
law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts." The defendant argued that the instruction forced him to
bear the burden of proof on the element of intent and thereby violated his
right to due process. The instruction was delivered over this objection and
the jury returned a guilty verdict.
1. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
2. 9 J WIGMORE, A TREATISE OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE § 2498a (3d ed.
1940 & Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE], states that:
[P] resumption means that where one or more specific facts are proved, as evidence tending to
prove a fact-in-issue, and no evidence negativing the fact-in-issue has been introduced, the
fact-in-issue is by rule of law established as proved, without further evidence in the
affirmative.
Professor Morgan states that a "true" presumption is one that creates an inference that is mandatory
unless evidence is produced to the contrary. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 31-37 (1963).
The word has, however, taken on a number of different meanings. See notes 51-53 infra.
3. MONT REV. CODE ANN (Supp. 1973): The Statute provides:
94-5-101. Criminal homicide. (1) A person commits the offense of criminal homicide if he
purposely, knowingly or negligently causes the death of another human being.
(2) Criminal homicide is deliberate homicide, mitigated deliberate homicide, or negligent
homicide.
94-5-102. Deliberate homicide. (1) Except as provided in 94-5-103(1)(a), criminal homicide
constitutes deliberate homicide if:
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly. ...
4. 442 U.S. 510, 512 (1979). The petitioner argued that "a personality disorder aggravated by
alcohol consumption" constituted the "mental disease."
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Sandstrom's conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Montana
Supreme Court.5 Commenting on the jury instruction,6 the court noted
that such a presumption had been "a part of Montana law since 1895" 7 and
had been reviewed and approved in a recent state decision.8 The court
rejected the due process objection by stating that although the prosecution
must bear the burden of proof on each element of the crime, the presump-
tion in question merely imposed a burden of production on the defendant.
The presumption only allocated "some burden of proof '' 9 to the defendant
by requiring him to produce some evidence of lack of intent.
The United States Supreme Court viewed the presumption different-
ly, 10 and reversed and remanded Sandstrom's conviction.11 The Court
stated that the jury, acting reasonably, could have interpreted the instruc-
tion in an unconstitutional manner since no guidance was offered on the
presumption's effect. The jury may have perceived the presumption as
conclusive or as shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of
intent. 12 Either interpretation would have violated Sandstrom's right to
due process under the fourteenth amendment.
II. RATIONALE AND VALIDITY OF PRESUMPTIONS
While presumptions are generally used to achieve a variety of re-
sults, 13 presumptions in criminal cases typically arise in response to the
prosecution's difficulty in proving an element of the crime, most often the
mental element. For instance, in Sandstrom, defendant's intent or lack
thereof can be known for certain only by the defendant. The prosecution
must rely on circumstantial evidence to prove this element beyond a
reasonable doubt. The presumption eases the prosecution's burden by
allowing the mental element to be inferred from the act. Although the jury
naturally might make the inference from the evidence, the presumption
5. State v. Sandstrom, 580 P.2d 106 (Mont. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
6. Another issue was Sandstrom's requested review of the trial court's decision to deny a change
of venue due to allegedly prejudicial pretrial publicity.
7. State v. Sandstrom, 580 P.2d 106, 109 (Mont. 1978), rev'd442 U.S. 510 (1979), quotingState
v. McKenzie, 581 P.2d 1205, 1222 (Mont. 1978).
8. State v. Coleman, 579 P.2d 732 (Mont. 1978).
9. State v. Sandstrom, 580 P.2d 106, 109 (Mont. 1978) (emphasis in original).
10. As Sandstrom noted, 442 U.S. 510, 514 n.3 (1979), a number of courts had already
disapproved of this instruction. See Chappell v. United States, 270 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1959); Bloch v.
United States, 221 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1955); Berkovitz v. United States, 213 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1954);
Wardlaw v. United States, 203 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1953); Hall v. State, 272 So. 2d 590, 593 (Ala. Ct.
Crim. App. 1973); State v. Warbritton, 211 Kan. 506,506 P.2d 1152 (1973). See also United States v.
Wharton, 139 U.S. App. 293,433 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In addition, two Circuit Courts of Appeals
have ordered their district courts to delete the instruction in future cases. See United States v. Garrett,
574 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Chiantese, 560 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1977).
11. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion for the Court; Justices Rehnquist and Burger
concurred.
12. The Montana Supreme Court had interpreted the "purposely or knowingly" language to
embody the criminal intent element of the offense. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U.S. 510 (1979).
13. See, e.g., Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644, 648 (1934).
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assures the factfinder that a conviction can be secured even if there is no
direct evidence on an element. Professor McCormick notes that a pre-
sumption helps to "correct an imbalance resulting from one party's supe-
rior access to the proof.' 4 Case law likewise views presumptions as having
this purpose, 5 and even the most recent decisions proclaim the vitality of
presumptions when used in a proper manner.'
6
On the other side of the coin, the effectiveness of the presumption
demands the safeguard of certain limitations. This Comment will address
these restrictions.
III. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has dealt with two lines of cases concerning
presumptions in the criminal law. The first set examines the prima facie
constitutional validity of the presumption, that is, whether the content of
the presumption meets the due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment. The second line of cases concerns the way in which the jury
interprets the effect of the presumption. The former approach focuses on
the actual words of the presumption while the latter examines the instruc-
tions and general presentation to the jury to determine how a reasonable
juror may have applied the presumption. Both statutorily created and
common-law presumptions must meet these two standards.
A. Determining the Constitutionality of a Presumption
1. Rational Connection Test
The rational connection test is still the standard used to evaluate the
facial validity of a presumption, but the test has undergone some develop-
ment. As first enunciated in 1910,17 the test required only that there exist
"some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall
not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate."'18
Although the test was rather toothless at this early stage, one of its
first applications in a criminal case gave the rational connection test some
bite. In McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Company 9 the Court was
confronted with a Louisiana statute which presumed that anyone in the
sugar refining business who paid less for the product in Louisiana than in
other states was part of a monopoly. In striking down the statute, the
Court warned that "the legislature may go a good way in raising [a
14. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 343 (2d ed. 1972 &Supp.
1978) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
15. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 409 (1970).
16. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
17. Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910). The case concerned
a Mississippi statute that imposed a presumption of negligence on the part of the railroad once
damages were proved. The presumption was deemed constitutional.
18. Id. at 43.
19. 241 U.S. 79 (1916).
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presumption] or in changing the burden of proof, but there are limits ...
[I]t is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty
or presumptively guilty of a crime."'
Subsequent cases looked to a combination of sometimes elusive
factors to judge the rational connection between the presumption and the
fact proved. Such factors included a consideration of extrinsic matter to
put the offense and the presumption in context.
In Yee Hem v. United States2' the Court upheld under the rational
connection test a statutory presumption that a possessor of opium knew
that it had been illegally imported. In reaching its decision, the Court
considered related issues such as when the importation was outlawed. It
concluded that "[1]egitimate possession ... [was] highly improbable. 22
Thus, knowledge of the illegality could be rationally presumed from the
possession.
In like manner, the Court in another case23 found a rational connec-
tion between the unexplained presence of a defendant at the site of an
illegal still and the presumption that he was "carrying on" an unbonded
distillery. The Court noted that the stills were usually well hidden and
accessible only to those engaged in the business. The extrinsic fact of how
typical stills were operated bolstered the rationality of the statute. A later
case, however, failed to find the necessary link between presence at a still
and possession of the business.24 The connection was strained and pre-
sumed too much from a solitary fact.
The original formulation of the rational connection test offered the
Court a rather free hand in its examination of presumptions. A better
defined test was beginning to evolve.
2. Redefining the Rational Connection Test
The structure of the rational connection test was tailored somewhat
by Tot v. United States.25 The Court, in announcing that the rational
connection test was the only relevant standard and that no alternative tests
would be considered, expressly rejected the "comparative convenience"
test 26 that allowed a presumption to burden a defendant whenever the
20. Id. at 86.
21. 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
22. Id. at 184.
23. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
24. United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
25. 319 U.S. 463 (1943). The case was brought under a provision of the Federal Firearms Act
which stated that a person found in possession of a firearm who had previously been convicted of a
violent crime was to be presumed to have received the weapon through interstate commerce in
violation of the statute. The Court held that the connection between possession and interstate
commerce was not a rational one, and thus the presumption violated due process.
26. See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934); Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89 (1933);
Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928).
Tot also rejected the position that "Congress' greater power to enact a statute to prohibit the
possession of all firearms by persons convicted of violent crimes, necessarily included the lesserpower
to create the presumption in question." MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at § 344.
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accused possessed greater familiarity with the facts and which asked
whether "on balance, it is easier for the defendant to disprove the presumed
fact than for the prosecutor to prove it."' 27 Although the Court's rejection
of the comparative convenience test was not very significant since it had
not been widely endorsed, the Court's reasoning put an interesting gloss on
the rational connection test: "Nor can the fact that the defendant has the
better means of information, standing alone, justify the creation of such a
presumption." 28 The Court's disapproval of the better access to informa-
tion rationale, which traditionally had been a basic premise behind the use
of presumptions, 29 revealed the Court's aversion to devices that force an
unfair onus upon the defendant.
The most noteworthy restatement of the rational connection test is
found in Leary v. United States.30
The upshot of Tot, Gainey, and Romano is . . . that a criminal statutory
presumption must be regarded as "irrational" or "arbitrary", and hence
unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that
the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on
which it is made to depend.3
By requiring the link between the fact proved and the presumption to be
"more likely than not" as opposed to merely "rational," the previous
standard of constitutionality was strengthened. Nevertheless, the Leary
test may yet be an inadequate means of protecting the defendant's due
process rights.
3. The Reasonable Doubt Test
The Leary Court evaded the issue whether an even higher standard,
the reasonable doubt test, should apply to presumptions that aid in
establishing an element of the crime charged.32 The question remains
unanswered but its recurrence in subsequent cases manifests its salience.
Of major importance is the principle that a conviction must rest upon
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But if a case can be supported
with a presumption that would not meet this standard, the defendant may
have been denied due process. Furthermore, such a double standard might
encourage the prosecution to rely on the presumption instead of attempt-
ing to offer evidence on the element.
33
27. Bewley, The Unconstitutionality ofStatutory Presumptions, 22 STAN. L. REv. 341,345 n.32
(1970).
28. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
29. See notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.
30. 395 U.S. 6 (1969), in which knowledge of the illegal importation of marijuana was presumed
from its possession. Because of the large amount of marijuana grown within the country, the Court
held invalid that part of the presumption that presumed knowledge from possession.
31. Id. at 36.
32. The Court stated that the statute did not meet the more-likely-than-not standard, so there
was no need to consider whether a criminal presumption must adhere to the reasonable doubt test. 395
U.S. 6, 36 n.64 (1969).
33. Bewley, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Presumptions, 22 STAN. L. REV. 341, 353
(1970).
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In Turner v. United States34 the Court again mentioned the possibility
that the reasonable doubt test might apply to criminal presumptions. The
case concerned a statutory presumption, similar to that in Leary, in which
knowledge of the illegal importation of a narcotic could be presumed from
possession. The Court concluded:
[T]he overwhelming evidence is that the heroin consumed in the United
States is illegally imported. . . . Whether judged by the more-likely-than-
not standard . . . or by the more exacting reasonable-doubt standard nor-
mally applicable in criminal cases, [the statutory presumption] is valid insofar
as it permits a jury to infer that heroin possessed in this country is a smuggled
drug.
3 5
Reviewing a history of cases that had assumed the principle, In Re
Winship36 declared that, in a criminal case, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is a constitutional requirement. The Court confirmed a rule that had
long ago developed strong roots in all American jurisdictions37 by stating
that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. 3 8 This explicit statement
raises questions about the constitutionality of a presumption that meets
only the rational connection test, and thus permits a conviction despite the
lack of sufficient proof on an element of the crime.3
The Court continued to "shuffle step" the reasonable doubt issue in
Barnes v. United States.40 After examining the cases it concluded "that if a
statutory inference . . . satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard (that is,
the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational
juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well as the
more-likely-than-not standard, then it clearly accords with due process.
' I
Two cases decided the same term as Sandstrom moved toward and
34. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
35. Id. at 415-16.
36. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
37. Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88
YALE L.J. 1325 (1979). The authors point out that a formal interpretation of Winship makes the case
seem "scarcely revolutionary." As traditional doctrine advised, the prosecution must prove the
elements of the crime to meet the reasonable doubt standard, and the accused bears the burden of proof
on the issue of defenses. A procedural approach would, however, give a far more expansive
interpretation to Winship. This formulation would require "the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt not only the presence of every element of the offense, but also the absence of
justification, excuse, or other grounds of exculpation or mitigation." Since "crimes" and "defenses" are
"substantially equivalent", such an approach is a plausible, although not an accepted one. Id. at 1328-
1338.
38. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
39. See Bewley, The Unconstitutionality ofPresumptions,22 STAN. L. REv. 341,349 (1970).The
author states that statutory presumptions under the Leary test deny due process because "(1) they
permit verdicts based upon evidence insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt, (2)
they force the jury to make arbitrary decisions, and (3) they direct verdicts for the prosecution
unconstitutionally."
40. 412 U.S. 837 (1973). The Barnes Court found a rational connection between the petitioner's
possession of stolen Treasury checks and the presumption that the accused knew they were stolen.
41. Id. at 843.
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then retreated from an assertion that criminal presumptions must meet the
reasonable doubt standard. In Jackson v. Virginia42 the Court announced
that in reviewing a conviction being challenged for insufficiency of evi-
dence, the previous standard,43 which required only the existence of some
evidence on every element of the crime, was no longer acceptable. Rather,
the test is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' '44 Thus, any element of
the crime that had been proved through the use of a presumption was
required to meet this strict standard.
The retreat came in County Court of Ulster v. Allen,45 in which the
defendants challenged a statutory presumption 46 on the ground that it
should be judged according to the reasonable doubt standard. That is, the
presumption is valid only if the facts necessary to raise the inference are
sufficient for "a rational jury to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable
doubt. ', 47 The Court declared that "the prosecution may rely on all of the
evidence in the record to meet the reasonable-doubt standard. . . "As
long as it is clear that the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for
a finding of guilt, it need only satisfy the test described in Leary.',48 While
Jackson intimated that a rational factfinder must be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt concerning each element, Allen stated that the test
applies to the record when viewed in its entirety. Since challenges based on
insufficiency of evidence are typically aimed at a single element of the
crime (usually the mental state) it appears that Jackson, when read in
conjunction with Allen, failed to strengthen the rational connection test to
any great degree.
Sandstrom did not discuss the validity of the presumption in terms of
the rational connection test since the challenge focused on the jury instruc-
tion. Nevertheless, it is interesting to surmise the outcome of such a
challenge under both the rational connection and reasonable doubt stand-
ards. Under the former test, it seems likely that the instruction "[t]he law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts" would be upheld. In Sandstrom, for example, a rational connection
could be found between the intent to kill and the defendant's act of
stabbing the victim. But if the reasonable doubt rule were to be applied, it
would be more difficult to find the necessary nexus, especially in light of
the defendant's assertion that he lacked the requisite mental state.
42. 443 U.S. 307, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890 (1979).
43. The former standard was announced in Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
44. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).
45. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
46. The New York law raised a presumption that a firearm present in an automobile is possessed
by all persons in the car unless (as one exception provides) the weapon is found upon the person of one
of the occupants.
47. County Court v. Alien, 442 U.S. 140, 166 (1979).
48. Id. at 167.
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A presumption in the criminal law that deals with an element of the
crime must first satisfy the rational connection test previously discussed.
As the following section emphasizes, the presumption must then be deli-
vered to the jury in a constitutionally permissible manner.
B. Delivering the Presumption to the Jury
The Sandstrom Court reviewed only the second prong of the test to be
met by a presumption, that is, whether the jury constitutionally used the
presumption. As the Court had previously stated, the review must consider
"the context of the instructions as a whole" 49 to determine if the jury gave
the presumption more weight than is permissible.
At the trial level, the Sandstrom jury was instructed that "[t]he law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts." On certiorari, the Supreme Court recognized that since the jury was
given no further guidance on the effect of the presumption,5 it could have
been interpreted in any of four ways: as a conclusive presumption," as a
presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion,52 as a permissive
presumption,53 and as a presumption that shifts the burden of production.
The Court stressed that the issue "requires careful attention to the words
actually spoken to the jury .. .for whether a defendant has been
accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a
reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction. 54
The following sections will highlight the historical background
49. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 70 (1965).
50. "No instructions were given to the jury defining the classification, nature or effects of
presumptions in criminal proceedings." Brief for Petitioner at 17, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979).
51. Conclusive and mandatory presumptions may be defined as follows:
Conclusive Presumption: a presumption in which the existence of one fact is conclusive
as to the existence of another fact, and which cannot be overcome by rebutting evidence.
Mandatory Presumption: a presumption in which the existence of one fact is conclusive
as to the existence of another fact, but which can be overcome by rebutting evidence.
Case Note, 12 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 301,301 n.2 (1977). See County Court v. Allen,442 U.S. 140,
157 (1979)("A mandatory presumption .. .tells the trier [of fact) that he or they must find the
elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless the defendant has come forvard with some
evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts.") (emphasis in original).
52. The Sandstrom court noted the two ways in which the burden of proof may be viewed. This
distinction was first stated in J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE ATTHE COMMON LAW
355 (1898):
In legal discussion . . . "the burden of proof" is used in several ways. It marks, (1) The
peculiar duty of him who has the risk of any given proposition on which the parties are at
issue-who will lose the case if he does not make this proposition out. . . . (2) It stands
for ... the duty of going forward in argument or in producing evidence. . . . (3) There is
an undiscriminated use of the phrase ... in which it may mean either.
See also MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at §§ 336-47; 9 WIGMORE supra note-2, at §§ 2485-87.
53. The permissive inference or permissive presumption has recently been defined as "[t]he most
common evidentiary device . ..which allows-but does not require-the trier of fact to infer the
elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and that places no burden of any kind on
the defendant." County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979). A "permissive presumption" is now
the equivalent of the term "inference." "The employment here of the term 'presumption' is due simply
to historical usage, by which 'presumption' was originally a term equivalent, in one sense, to 'infer-
ence'." 9 WIGMORE, supra note 2, at § 2491.
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underlying each of the ways in which the Sandstrom jury could have used
the given presumption. Section IV will then consider Sandstrom's effect on
these four categories.
1. Conclusive Presumptions
The Court strongly noted its aversion to conclusive presumptions in
Morissette v. United States," in which the Court was faced with a federal
statute that presumed intent from proof of the act. The defendant had
wandered onto government property, loaded his truck with empty shell
casings, and then sold the salvaged metal. Although the accused protested
that he believed the casings to be abandoned, the trial court instructed the
jury to presume the intent, while forbidding the defendant to rebut the
presumption. Delving into the historical roots of the intent requirement,
the Supreme Court concluded that:
Where intent of the accused is an ingredient of the crime charged, its existence
is a question of fact which must be submitted to thejury. . . . It follows that
the trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue by instruction that the
law raises a presumption of intent from an act. 6
While Morissette's language is compelling, the holding of the case was
limited because it was based purely on the interpretation of a federal
statute.57
The proscription against conclusive presumptions was reinforced by
implication in In re Winship,"8 in which the Court emphasized that due
process requires the prosecution to prove every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, an instruction requiring the jury to
presume one element from proof of another would violate this
constitutional restriction.
The Court's consistent stand against the use of conclusive presump-
tions recently operated to strike down an instruction requiring the jury to
find an intent to violate antitrust laws whenever price-fixing was the
natural consequence of the defendant's acts. 59 The instruction prevented
the jury from deciding an element of the crime and "ultimately, the
decision on the issue of intent must be left to the trier of fact alone. 60
The Sandstrom Court noted that the instruction given to the jury
could have been interpreted as a conclusive presumption. "Upon finding
proof of one element of the crime (causing death), and of facts insufficient
to establish the second (the voluntariness and 'ordinary consequences' of
54. 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979).
55. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
56. Id. at 274.
57. See notes 79-80 and accompanying text infra for Sandstrom's expansion of this constitution-
al prohibition.
58. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
59. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
60. Id. at 446.
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defendant's action), Sandstrom's jurors could reasonably have concluded
that they were directed to find against the defendant on the element of
intent. '61 The general verdict gave no indication of how the jury actually
perceived the instruction. This one tainted interpretation was enough to
require a remand, but the Court went on to examine other approaches.
2. Presumptions that Shift the Burden of Persuasion
A defendant's right to due process is infringed if a presumption forces
the burden of persuasion of an element of the crime onto the defendant. In
Mullaney v. Wilbur62 the accused was charged with murder, a crime that
required proof of both intent and malice. The jury was instructed that if the
requisite intent were proved, then malice would be presumed unless the
defendant were able to establish that he acted in the heat of passion, a
showing that would reduce the penalty imposed. The majority stated that
the constitutional principle requiring the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every element necessary to constitute a crime is not
limited to facts that, if proved, would exonerate the defendant.63 Thus, the
presumption delivered to the jury shifted the burden of persuasion to the
defense, a clear Winship violation.
A near turnabout 64 from the Mullaney decision occurred in Patterson
v. New York.65 In that case, a statute required a defendant charged with
murder to bear the burden of proof on the affirmative defense of "extreme
emotional disturbance." The Court held that the allocation of the burden
of persuasion on this issue did not violate due process. Unlike the statute in
66
Mullaney, this mental state was not an element of the crime. In short,
"the reasonable doubt rule, after Patterson, applies only to those facts the
state legislature has deemed important enough to include in the definition
of the offense. 67
In Sandstrom, intent was clearly an element of the crime charged so
that both Mullaney and Patterson are in accord that the prosecution bore
the burden of persuasion. Since the jury might have misinterpreted this
61. 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979).
62. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
63. Id. at 697-98.
64. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at § 341 (Supp. 1978) who found: "The constitutionali-
ty of placing the burden of persuasion on the accused with regard to an affirmative defense has been the
subject of two surprising, if not contradictory, recent decisions of the Supreme Court."
65. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
66. Thus, Patterson seems to have put the law back to what it was prior to Mullaney. "The
general understanding of Winship after Patterson is just what it was before Mullaney: A state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt those facts that formally define the crime charged but not those facts
that establish a defense or a mitigation of liability." Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and
Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1342-43 (1979).
67. Comment, Affirmative Criminal Defenses- The Reasonable Doubt Rule in the Aftermath
ofPatterson v. New York, 39 OHIo St. L.J. 393 (1978). SeeNote, The Constitutionality ofAffirmative
Defenses after Patterson v. New York, 78 COLUI. L. REV. 655 (1978).
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allocation because of the faulty instruction, the defendant was denied due
process.
3. Permissive Presumptions
A permissive presumption68 advises the jury that they may make
inferences from the circumstantial evidence presented at trial. While this is
a natural function performed by ajury without direction, a presumption to
this effect emphasizes to the jury that a conviction can be returned, even in
the absence of direct evidence on an element of the crime.
The validity of permissive presumptions is supported by the 1979 case
of County Court of Ulster v. Allen.69 The Court noted that, as long as the
presumption satisfies the Leary test 70 and the trial judge clearly indicates to
the jury that it is permissive, then the presumption is valid.
The Sandstrom Court did not discuss the validity of a permissive
presumption. Since the jury could have interpreted the instruction in an
unconstitutional manner, a reversal was required.
4. Presumptions that Shift the Burden of Production
It is not clear whether a presumption that shifts only the burden of
production would be deemed constitutional. Since a presumption has
never been stricken for this reason, some authors have concluded that it is
permissible. One writer believes that a shift in this burden has "little, if any,
impact on the substantive relation between the state and the criminal
accused. . . . [T]here appears to be a consensus that shifting the burden
of production is a permissible housekeeping device."'"
Strong arguments can be made, however, for reaching the opposite
conclusion. The main policy behind a presumption that shifts the burden
of production rests on the reasoning that since the defendant has better
access to the proof of a certain element of the crime, he or she should bring
forth relevant evidence. The Court has not found this policy argument to
be persuasive. In Tot v. United States72 the Court pointed out that
defendants always have greater or equal access to the facts. "It might,
therefore, be argued that to place upon all defendants in criminal cases the
burden of going forward with the evidence would be proper. But the
argument proves too much."" The Court warned that the burden of
production may not be freely shifted to the defendant. The Court has since
68. See note 53 supra.
69. 442 U.S. 140 (1979). See notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
70. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
71. Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burdens of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88
YALE L.J. 1325, 1334 (1979).
72. 319 U.S. 463 (1943). See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
73. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
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interpreted Tot as saying that, if the rational connection test is satisfied,
this burden may fall on the defendant.74
Two primary constitutional objections have been raised to a
presumption that shifts the burden of production on an element of the
offense. The first focuses on the presumption of innocence bestowed upon
all defendants in criminal trials. If the defendant produced no evidence on
the element, the prosecution would be entitled to an unconstitutional
directed verdict. "A true shifting of the burden of producing evidence to
the defendant in a criminal case would mean that the court would be
compelled to direct the jury to find against him with regard to the
presumed fact if he fails to introduce sufficient proof on the issue."7
5
A second constitutional argument notes that if a defendant is forced
to come forward with evidence on an element of the crime, it might force
the defendant to take the witness stand. One Supreme Court Justice
warned that this would be a "clear violation of the accused's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."
76
The Supreme Court of Montana found that the Sandstrom
instruction was innocuous since it shifted only the burden of production to
the defendant. The court noted that there was no proscription against
allocating "some burden of proof to a defendant under certain
circumstances. . . . Defendant's sole burden . . . was to produce some
evidence that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts. 77 However, the United States Supreme Court observed that even
Montana's Rules of Evidence would have led to an unconstitutional
interpretation of the presumption.78 Thus, Sandstrom did not reach the
question of to what extent the burden of production can be levied on the
criminal defendant.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF Sandstrom
The Court in Sandstrom focused on the manner in which the
presumption was delivered to the jury and concluded that it could have
been interpreted in any of four ways. The following sections discuss the
light shed by Sandstrom on the constitutionality of each of these four
possible interpretations, as well as the questions Sandstrom left un-
answered.
74. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 n.l1 (1973).
75. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at § 342.
76. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 432 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
77. State v. Sandstrom, 580 P.2d 106, 109 (Mont. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 510(1979) (emphasis in
original).
78. MONT. R. EvID. 301 (b) (2) requires a preponderance of the evidence to overcome this
presumption. The Supreme Court concluded that "[s]uch a requirement shifts not only the burden of
production, but also the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of intent." Sandstrom v. Montana,




The Sandstrom decision raised the proscription against conclusive
presumptions to a constitutional level. Although Morissette" struck down
such a presumption, the case was limited to federal law and did not discuss
the constitutional implications. Furthermore, Morissette was decided long
before the presumption of innocence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt
were expressly cited as constitutional principles. Citing cases such as
Morissette, the Court in Sandstrom stated:
[A] conclusive presumption in this case would "conflict with the overriding
presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which
extends to every element of the crime," and would "invade [the] fact-finding
function" which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury.80
Any presumption requiring the jury to find the existence of one element of
a crime from proof of another thus will be viewed as a constitutional
violation. While this is not at all an unexpected conclusion since Winship
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of the crime, it
is significant that Sandstrom has so clearly resolved the issue.
B. Shifting the Burden of Persuasion
Sandstrom confirmed the holdings of prior cases cautioning that a
presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion on an element of the
crime to the defendant violates due process. Since intent was an element of
the crime charged, the Sandstrom instruction may have been used by the
jury in this unconstitutional manner.
The Sandstrom Court was unequivocal on this issue, but it failed to
resolve a related problem that has long plagued the criminal law: when
intent is an element of the crime, can the defendant be made to bear the
burden of persuasion on the issue of insanity?
An old English decision, M'Naghten's case,8' established the prin-
ciple that every person is presumed sane and the burden of persuasion
on the issue of insanity rests on the accused, a principle subsequently
adopted by many American jurisdictions.82 In the federal courts the
prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt,83 although the
states are not constitutionally required to follow this rule.
The Court confronted this issue in Leland v. Oregon,84 a 1952 case in
which that state's law required a defendant in a murder trial to prove
79. See notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
80. 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979).
81. 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 10 C1. & Fin. 200 (H.L., 1843).
82. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 2, at § 2501.
83. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
84. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
19801 1157
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Over a strong dissent, the Court
found no due process violation since sanity was "an issue set apart from the
crime charged. 86 Despite this assertion, it is not clear whether questions of
sanity and intent are so distinct 87 that the defendant can be made to bear
the burden of proof on the former while the prosecution must prove the
latter. Winship88 requires the prosecution to prove every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, if the issue of insanity and intent
do in fact overlap, the burden imposed on the defendant would be violative
of the Winship rule. Notions of due process have evolved since the Leland
pronouncement, causing some commentators to believe that a similar
statute today would no longer meet constitutional tests.89
The Court, however, has given no indication that it plans to overturn
Leland. The dissent in Mullaney" reaffirmed the idea that insanity and
mens rea are separate issues and can impose different burdens of proof on
the parties. In 1976, a case specifically questioning the continuing validity
of Leland was dismissed by the Court because it did not raise a substantial
federal question. 91 Finally, in Patterson v. New York, 92 the Court stated
"[w]e are unwilling to reconsider Leland and Rivera. 93 Sandstrom offered
no further guidance on this conceptual perplexity.
C. Permissive Presumptions
Sandstrom does not dwell on the constitutional validity of a per-
missive presumption since the jury may have viewed the instruction as
mandatory. "They were not told that they had a choice, or that they might
infer that conclusion; they were told only that the law presumed it.",94 The
constitutionality of a permissive presumption is, however, clear. The jury
will ordinarily draw inferences on their own, and a permissive presumption
(assuming that it meets the rational connection test) merely assists this
process.
D. Shifting the Burden of Production
The constitutionality of requiring the defendant to bear the burden of
85. Justices Frankfurter and Black argued that although a state generally has much flexibility in
determining how the issue of insanity is to be handled, the Oregon statute imposed a burden beyond the
restrictions of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 802-07. (Black and Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting).
86. Id. at 795-96.
87. See Comment, Mens Rea and Insanity, 28 MAINE L. REV. 500 (1976) for a discussion of the
problem and how mens rea and insanity can sometimes coexist.
88. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
89. See, e.g., Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV., 49, 51-53 (1975)
(suggests that the combination of Winship and Mullaney "calls into question the continued validity of
state rules requiring defendants to prove insanity as a defense to a criminal charge").
90. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,705 (1975). See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
91. Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
92. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
93. Id. at 207.
94. 442 U.S. 510, 515 (1979).
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production on an element of the crime has long been an unsolved
mystery.95 Sandstrota made no effort to end the debate. The only reference
to this issue is a footnote explaining how the burden differs when it rests on
the prosecutor or the defendant.96 A prosecutor's failure to meet this
burden leads to an acquittal. A defendant's failure to meet the burden of
production cannot, however, result in a directed verdict. Perhaps the
Court is implying that on certain issues a defendant normally must present
some evidence or the circumstantial evidence will overwhelm the
presumption of innocence. For example, in Holland v. United States,97 a
sizeable, unexplained increase in defendant's net worth resulted in a
conviction for tax fraud. The Court affirmed the conviction, finding no
constitutional problem in the fact that the circumstantial evidence
imposed a burden on the defendant to explain his finances. In contrast, a
true shifting of the burden of production (that is, one that would result in a
directed verdict if no evidence were produced) would be impermissible.
Sandstrom leaves the resolution of this issue to future decisions, and its
fleeting reference to the problem is unclear.
V. ATTENDING TO THE RESTRICTIONS ON PRESUMPTIONS
State legislatures, faced with the limitations on presumptions of intent
and the apparent confusion regarding the insanity defense may concoct
some novel methods of avoiding the entire problem. One such method is to
redefine or eliminate an element of the crime so that a presumption that
normally aids in the proof of an elusive element will no longer be needed.
An example of such a redefinition is Ohio's receipt of stolen property
statute.98 Although actual knowledge was formerly a part of the crime, the
present statute states that "knowing or having reasonable cause to believe"
that the property is stolen will satisfy a conviction.99 Thus, the legislature
has redefined an element of the crime, and has changed actual knowledge
to knowledge that a reasonable person would have had. This newer
element is much less difficult to prove, and no presumption of any kind is
necessary.
While it is questionable whether such drafting can avoid the
95. See notes 71-76 and accompanying text supra.
96. 442 U.S. 510, 516 n.5 (1979).
97. 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
98. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.51 (Page 1975).
99. Id. (emphasis added). The statute states: "(A) No person shall receive, retain or dispose of
property of another, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it has been obtained through
commission of a theft offense." The Committee Comment states: "This section differs from the former
offense of receiving stolen property. . . . Under the former statute an offender actually had to know
that the property received was stolen property, whereas under this section it is sufficient if the offender
had reasonable cause to believe that the property is 'hot'." Committee Comment, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2913.51 (Page 1975). This statute was held valid despite a due process challenge. State v.
Arthur, 42 Ohio St. 2d 67, 325 N.E.2d 888 (1975). The court held that possession of stolen goods can
create an inference of guilty knowledge which resulted in a conviction.
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restrictions outlined in Sandstrom, the constitutional validity of omitting
elements of a crime would be even more suspect. This scheme is an inviting
one since cases such as Morissette and Patterson confine their restrictions
(regarding presumptions that are conclusive or that shift the burden of
persuasion) to elements that are included in the definition of the crime.
Nevertheless, the special status of intent in the criminal law unavoidably
suggests that its elimination would be viewed as a deprivation of due
process. Jerome Hall, a chief proponent of the necessity of the intent
element, writes that the principles of criminal law can be stated in a single
generalization: "The harm forbidden in a penal law must be imputed to any
normal adult who voluntarily commits it with criminal intent, and such a
person must be subjected to the legally prescribed punishment."'00
Likewise, case law has recognized the salience of the intent element.
Morissette noted:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent
in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good
and evil.'0 '
The Court continued:
The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a
guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the
defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil
purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed juries. 02
The Model Penal Code also reflects the importance of the element of
intent.'13
An examination of strict liability statutory offenses provides an
interesting sidelight to this issue. These statutes require no mental element
and are justified with policy arguments focusing on the benefit to
enforcement and efficiency.10 4 Typically, strict liability has been confined
to areas such as public welfare offenses'0 5 and public nuisances. 10 6 The
Model Penal Code permits strict liability only for minor offenses carrying
minimal penalties and stigma.'0 7 Nevertheless, liability without guilty
intent has been imposed on defendants in more serious crimes. The most
notable is United States v. Balint,10 8 in which the defendant was convicted
of selling opium illegally, although he argued that he believed it to be
100. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 18 (2d ed. 1947) (emphasis deleted).
101. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
102. Id. at 263.
103. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 Criminal Homicide; § 210.2 Murder (P.O.D. 1962).
104. See Mueller, Mens Rea and the Law Without It, 58 W. VA. L. REV. 34, 38 (1955).
105. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLuM. L. REv. 55 (1933).
106. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW ch. 7, § 5 (2d ed. 1969).
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 & Comments (P.O.D. 1962).
108. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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sugar. While it has been suggested that the strict liability approach may be
an effective one, 109 most commentators remain critical, and courts often
imply the mental element into the statute. ° A classic test to decide
whether a mental element should be implied in a federal law was
enunciated in Holdridge v. United States:'"
From these cases emerges the proposition that where a federal criminal
statute omits mention of intent and where it seems to involve what is basically
a matter of policy, where the standard imposed is, under the circumstances,
reasonable and adherence thereto properly expected of a person, where the
penalty is relatively small, where conviction does not gravely besmirch, where
the statutory crime is not one taken over from the common law, and where
congressional purpose is supporting, the statute can be construed as one not
requiring criminal intent. The elimination of this element is then not violative
of the due process clause.
Thus, strict liability has been confined to minor offenses, illustrating a
recognition that intent is a necessary element of more severe crimes
carrying more severe penalties.
Recent cases such as Sandstrom shed no light on the issue whether any
elements of a crime could be eliminated in an attempt to avoid the inherent
restrictions on the use of presumptions. Professor McCormick suggests
that a state may reallocate the burden of persuasion at will by simply
electing to define their statutes in the appropriate manner. 112 The case law,
however, hints otherwise. In Mullaney,' 3 the prosecution argued that the
Winship test should not extend to elements of the crime bearing only on
punishment, as opposed to guilt. The Court responded:
[I]f Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as defined by
state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought
to protect without effecting any substantive change in its law. It would only be
necessary to redefine the elements that constitute different crimes4
characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment.'14
109. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REv. 731 (1960).
110. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 31 at 218 (1972).
111. 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960).
112. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at § 341 (Supp. 1978):
Although the Court in Patterson did not intend to overrule Mullaney, the remaining vitality
of the latter is doubtful. Limiting Mullaney to instances in which the very gravamen of the
affirmative defense is included in the definition of the crime itself severely restricts the
effectiveness of the case as precedent. States electing to place the burden of persuasion with
regard to an affirmative defense on the accused must be careful to word or to reword their
statutes so as to eliminate from the definition of the offense the converse of the element which
the defendant must prove. If so worded, the allocation of the burden to the accused will
probably survive an attack based upon Winship, Mullaney, and the due process clause. Broad
limitations on the power are suggested in Patterson, but it now may be that if the state has the
constitutional power to make acts criminal, it may provide for conviction based upon these
acts alone and relegate all mitigating factors to the status of affirmative defenses to be
established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.
113. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
114. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975).
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Mullaney is still good law although Patterson"5 drained much of its force.
Nevertheless, even the latter case addresses this issue:
This view may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof
by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crime now
defined in their statutes. But there are obviously constitutional limits beyond
which the States may not go in this regard."1
The dissent was not reassured:
The test the Court today established allows a legislature to shift, virtually at
will, the burden of persuasion with respect to any factor in a criminal case, so
long as it is careful not to mention the nonexistence of that factor in statutory
language that defines the crime."
7
While the constitutional limitations are by no means clear (if, indeed, they
exist), at least such statements by the Court manifest a recognition of the
problem and the Court's watchful eye in this area.
Setting constitutional limitations on the type of elements that can be
omitted from a crime necessarily entails a determination of what elements
are essential components of the crime. Although a formidable task, at least
one commentary makes impressive headway in articulating such
essentials."i' Until the Court formulates firm rules, however, the Montana
legislature could feasibly eliminate the intent element from the crime of
murder and thereby evade the Sandstrom problem in the future.
It has also been suggested" 9 that a sure way to conform to the
restrictions on presumptions is to avoid use of the word "presume."
Instructing the jury simply that they may "infer" intent from the act would
probably avoid the Sandstrom dilemma. The jurors would be more likely
to perceive the presumption as a mere permissive inference. This may not
always be the ultimate solution, however. For example, in a recent Ohio
case, State v. Price,120 the jury received the instruction "'[a] person acts
purposely when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a
certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish
thereby.' ,121 The Ohio Supreme Court found no constitutional violation
since the instruction, when viewed as a whole, did not relieve the state of its
burden of proof.122 But it seems unclear whether a reasonable juror could
have interpreted the instruction as presuming intent from the act.
A final method to abide by the constitutional boundaries of
115. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197(1977). See notes 64-67 and accompanying textsupra.
116. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
117. Id. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell had written the majority opinion in
Mullaney.
118. Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88
YALE L.J. 1325 (1979).
119. Case Note, 12 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 301 (1977).
120. 60 Ohio St. 2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979).
121. Id. at 140, 398 N.E.2d at 774-75.
122. The case will be appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Interview with Prof. Charles
Thompson, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio (December 1979).
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presumptions (and the safest alternative) is to eliminate the presumption
altogether. Ohio's Jury Instructions reflect this approach, recommending
that no charge be given to presume or infer intent from the act.' 23 As case
law dictates, intent would then be established by circumstantial evidence
and inferences that the jury will naturally draw. 124
VI. CONCLUSION
In many ways, presumptions still involve "subtle conceptions to
which not even judges always bring clear understanding."1 25 The
Sandstrom Court, however, took a step forward in deciphering the
problems attending use of presumptions. Sandstrom raised the prohibi-
tion against the use of conclusive presumptions to a constitutional level,
and it reaffirmed the proscription against shifting the burden of persuasion
on an element of the crime to the defendant. The Court also impliedly
noted the continued validity of permissive presumptions.
Sandstrom left two issues unresolved. The first is to what extent a
criminal defendant can be made to bear the burden of proof on the defense
of insanity when intent is an element of the crime. The second unanswered
question is whether a defendant can be made to bear a burden of
production on an element of the crime. Future cases must confront these
salient issues, but Sandstrom made impressive headway in delimiting the
constitutional restrictions that will be imposed on presumptions in the
criminal law.
Diane Marshall Ennist
123. 4 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 409.01 "Intent, Motive . . . (d) Presumption. Comment.
The Committee recommends that no instruction be given on the presumption or inference that a person
intends the natural consequences of his acts."
124. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978).
125. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946).
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